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This study is first in a series of pol-
icy briefs on Europe and its neigh-
bours in the east and south. In this 
series we will publish papers com-
missioned or produced by the Ber-
telsmann Stiftung in the framework 
of its work in this field. This policy 
brief is the product of the Bertels-
mann Stiftung’s cooperation with 
the Warsaw-based Institute of Pub-
lic Affairs. The text was completed 
on 17 of February 2014. 
 
Society – the decisive player in 
Ukrainian politics? 
 
The scale of the protests that 
started in November 2013 was a 
surprise even for the most experi-
enced observers of Ukraine’s polit-
ical and social life. One might think 
that the disillusionment after the 
Orange Revolution provoked grow-
ing apathy in society, which wasn’t 
able to be as active as it was at the 
end of 2004 and the beginning of 
2005. Why did such an immense 
eruption of protest explode in au-
tumn 2013? An answer should be 
looked for in the current political sit-
uation as well as in deeper social 
and political processes that have 
taken place in Ukraine over the last 
25 years. It seems to be more and 
more visible that society is becom-
ing the decisive player in Ukrainian 
politics. One could say that this 
should be an obvious situation. It is 
evident in democratic countries, 
however, but not in many post-so-
viet countries – Russia and Bela-
rus, for instance. 
 
The current political development 
in Ukraine shows that in 2014 this 
country is facing the most difficult 
period in its history of being an in-
dependent state, which began in 
1991. The authorities, which carry 
out anti-democratic actions, are de-
termined to stay in power using all 
means possible to achieve their 
goal. Thus, the next few months will 
be a battle between the ruling elite 
and the political opposition. The 
main question is: what will the role 
of society be, in particular its active 
part, in this difficult and decisive pe-
riod for the future of Ukraine? A 
short analysis of Ukrainian society 
over the last 25 years and some re-
flections on the current political sit-
uation are needed to answer this 
question. 
 
 
The phenomena of Ukrainian 
society 
 
Ukrainian society is rather atypical 
in comparison with the societies of 
many other post-Soviet countries. 
The political activity of Ukrainian 
society as a whole shouldn’t be 
overestimated, but in contrast to 
Russia and Belarus there is a sta-
ble critical mass in Ukraine inter-
ested in and capable of significantly 
influencing the political situation, 
sometimes even decisively. This 
doesn’t mean that there are no ac-
tive and politically motivated 
groups in Russian or Belarusian 
society, although in the latter they 
are very feeble and in the former 
they are growing but are still too 
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weak and fragmented to decisively 
influence the political situation. One 
of the reasons for this difference is 
that the level of fear and apathy is 
much lower in Ukrainian society 
than in Belarusian and Russian so-
cieties. 
 
The foundations of Ukrainian soci-
ety over the last two decades of an 
independent Ukraine is an ex-
tremely interesting phenomenon. 
Society could not be founded on a 
linguistic, religious, or ethnic basis 
as is too heterogeneous. It seems 
that the Ukrainians (the active part 
of society) have become more and 
more of a political nation based on 
opposition to the authoritarianism 
of the rulers, supporting more or 
less European values and democ-
racy. The support for democracy in 
Ukraine is not very high but much 
higher than the support for the au-
thoritarian system. According to a 
public opinion survey conducted in 
December 2013, 51 per cent of 
Ukrainians support democracy as 
the best political system for their 
country while 21 per cent think that 
autocracy is the best solution. The 
regional differences for the support 
of democracy are interesting: 
Western Ukraine – 77 per cent, 
Southern Ukraine – 56 per cent, 
Central Ukraine – 52, Eastern 
Ukraine – 36.1 Only in the Eastern 
part of Ukraine – the homeland of 
Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of 
Regions – are less than 50 per cent 
                                                          
1 http://dif.org.ua/en/polls/2014_polls/ 
dva-misjaci-protestiv-v-ukraini-sho-dali_--
-zagalnonacionalne-opituvannja.htm 
of the people supporters of democ-
racy, while most of the people from 
other parts of Ukraine support a 
democratic model for their country. 
One can risk posing a thesis that 
there is growing contradiction be-
tween the expectations of society 
and the reality of the political sys-
tem in Ukraine, which is becoming 
more and more autocratic. 
 
But it should be borne in mind that 
President Yanukovych and the 
Party of Regions are still supported 
by a significant part of society in 
Eastern and Southern parts of 
Ukraine. According to an opinion 
survey conducted by the Kyiv Inter-
national Institute of Sociology in 
November 2013, more than a quar-
ter (27%) of people in Eastern 
Ukraine and 21 per cent in South-
ern Ukraine claim that they will vote 
for the Party of Region in the next 
elections to the Ukrainian parlia-
ment. On the other hand, this party 
only has four per cent support in 
Western Ukraine and 12 per cent in 
Central Ukraine.2 This is a sign of 
the old division between pro-Euro-
pean Western and Central Ukraine 
and pro-Russian Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine. However, it 
should be noted that there are al-
ready visible groups of pro-Euro-
pean orientation in Eastern and 
Southern parts of Ukraine. There-
fore, one can say that this division 
of Ukraine between West and cen-
tre on the one hand and East and 
2 http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat 
=reports&id=208&page=1 
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South on the other, is a stable phe-
nomenon but with slowly changing 
proportions in favour of pro-Euro-
pean orientation. Research con-
ducted by the Institute of Public Af-
fairs in the middle of 2013 shows 
that in three out of four regions 
(Western, Central, and Southern) 
support for EU integration is higher 
than for the Customs Union with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Only in Eastern Ukraine is the per-
centage of people willing to inte-
grate their country with the Cus-
toms Union higher than those who 
support EU integration of Ukraine. 
Nevertheless, the scale of support 
makes a difference. The support in 
favour of the EU is higher in West-
ern and Central Ukraine than the 
support in favour of the Customs 
Union in the East of Ukraine.3  
 
It is worth risking the thesis that 
pro-European people are rather ac-
tive and future oriented, while the 
pro-Russian (interested in integra-
tion with Russia, Belarus, and Ka-
zakhstan) part of society is rather 
passive and past-oriented. One 
cannot imagine several hundred 
thousands of protesters who would 
spontaneously gather to support in-
tegration with Russia. But this is the 
reality in the case of the pro-Euro-
pean and pro-democratic manifes-
tations. 
 
 
                                                          
3 For complex results please read: J. Fom-
ina, J. Kucharczyk, J. Konieczna-
Sałamatin, Ł. Wenerski, Poland – Ukraine, 
Poles – Ukrainians. A look across the bor-
A long tradition of protests’ 
movements  
 
Maidan 2013-2014 can be in-
scribed on the list of politically mo-
tivated protests that have taken 
place in Ukraine in the last 25 
years. However, it should be 
strongly underlined that it is not 
only the well-known Orange Revo-
lution in 2004-2005 that has taken 
place before today’s Maidan. The 
list of politically motivated protests 
in Ukraine is much longer. 
 
At the turn of the 21st century, 
Ukraine was shaken by massive 
protests named the Ukraine With-
out Kuchma movement. In 1999 
Leonid Kuchma, the president of 
Ukraine at the time, had won his 
second presidential election and 
was preparing to rule the country 
for the next five years. Harsh eco-
nomic conditions radicalised the 
citizens’ attitude towards the au-
thorities, although this did not esca-
late into massive demonstrations. 
The turning point was provoked by 
the events of late 2000. In Septem-
ber 2000, Georgiy Gongadze, co-
founder and editor of an online 
Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainska 
Pravda, widely known as a tracer of 
corruption among the most promi-
nent oligarchs and politicians, also 
from the presidential circle, disap-
peared in Kyiv. His beheaded body 
was found the following November, 
der, available at: http://isp.org.pl/up-
loads/fi-
lemanager/pdf/Spojrzenieprzezgrani-
cENGsummary.pdf 
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and President Kuchma was ac-
cused of ordering Gongadze’s kid-
nap. In turn, this caused citizens to 
become extremely angry at the 
supposed ruthlessness and brutal-
ity of the authorities, provoking 
people to take to the streets and 
start protesting. The first protests 
started in December 2000, with de-
monstrators demanding the resig-
nation of President Kuchma and a 
proper investigation into the Gon-
gadze case. It soon turned into 
long-lasting campaign supported 
by the opposition parties and stu-
dents. There were tents on Maidan, 
people living on the main square – 
a microscale of which is visible to-
day on “Euromaidan”. The peak of 
the protests was on 9 March 2001 
– the anniversary of Taras 
Shevchenko’s birthday, when units 
of the most active demonstrators 
and riot police clashed. Protesters 
stormed the building of the presi-
dential administration and the Min-
istry of Interior, but without suc-
cess. Instead, participants were 
beaten and prosecuted. The scale 
of the March action, and the brutal 
repercussions led to decreasing 
support for the movement. Alt-
hough the protest failed in the end, 
it can be treated as a trigger for 
crystallising new opposition lead-
ers, who would have played a deci-
sive role in the Orange Revolution.4  
 
Earlier still, in Soviet Ukraine, the 
Revolution On Granite took place – 
                                                          
4 To learn more about the Ukraine With-
out Kuchma movement please read: 
http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/19091 
a massive protest and hunger 
strike by students and pupils, or-
ganised in October 1990. The pro-
testers only spent 16 days on the 
October Revolution Square (now 
Maidan of Independence) in Kyiv, 
where they installed a tent city, but 
this had a crucial influence on fu-
ture internal changes in Soviet 
Ukraine. The aim of the action was 
to reach the authorities of Soviet 
Ukraine with demands including: 
the re-election of the Verkhovna 
Rada based on a multi-party ap-
proach; the resignation of Leonid 
Kuchma, who was at that time serv-
ing as the head of the Verkhovna 
Rada, and Vitaly Masol, head of the 
Council of Ministers of the Ukrain-
ian Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union; nationalisation of the Com-
munist Party property as well as as-
sets of the Komsol; ensuring that 
Ukrainian soldiers do their military 
service within Ukraine; and disa-
greement on signing the new 
agreement between the Soviet re-
publics. Day by day, the students 
gathered more support not only 
from their colleagues in the univer-
sities and technical colleges, but 
also the wider support of citizens of 
Kyiv. Demonstrations were also or-
ganised in other Ukrainian cities – 
for example Lviv, Luhansk, and Do-
netsk. The authorities, rattled by 
the situation and the rising anti-
government mood, decided to con-
sider the students’ demands. Alt-
hough in the end the demands 
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were introduced only partially, the 
protest showed how great the po-
tential of civil society in Ukraine is. 
What is more, the Granite Revolu-
tion was a first step towards adult 
politics for politicians such as Oleg 
Tyahnybok and Yuri Lutsenko.5   
 
The description of the above-men-
tioned protest doesn’t mean that 
there is continuity from one protest 
to another, as well as vivid con-
sciousness and knowledge about 
these protests, particularly the stu-
dents’ revolution in 1990, in Ukrain-
ian society, especially among the 
younger generation today. But it 
has to be underlined that all these 
protests show a constant readiness 
of a significant part of the people of 
Ukraine to manifest their opposition 
to the undemocratic behaviour of 
the authorities. Political forces in 
Ukraine, both the authorities and 
opposition parties, have to take this 
reality into account. 
 
 
The differences between Maidan 
2013-2014 and the Orange Revo-
lution 
 
Both Maidan 2013-2014 and the 
Orange Revolution are examples of 
massive politically motivated pro-
tests which gathered several hun-
dred thousand people in Kyiv and 
provoked actions of support in 
many regions of Ukraine. But there 
is a long list of differences between 
these two protests that should be 
                                                          
5 To learn more about the Revolution On 
Granite, a documentary film is available 
examined to understand the cur-
rent political situation in Ukraine 
correctly. 
 
Maidan was initiated and organised 
by the younger generation and rep-
resentatives of civil society as a 
manifestation of the pro-European 
aspirations of the protesters. They 
were not interested in the participa-
tion of political parties in their pro-
test. The political opposition only 
joined the protest later and has 
been represented by three political 
leaders and their parties: Vitali 
Klitschko (UDAR), Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk (the Fatherland party of 
Yulia Tymoshenko), and Oleh 
Tyahnybok (Svoboda). The Or-
ange Revolution was a political 
movement from the beginning with 
an undisputed political leader – 
Viktor Yushchenko, who was the 
most important representative of 
the political opposition at the time. 
It should be strongly underlined 
that anti-systemic elements absent 
in the Orange Revolution are visi-
ble in Maidan. The current protest 
is against the ruling elite but also 
keeps a distance towards the oppo-
sition parties. 
 
The Orange Revolution had a clear 
goal that might or might not have 
been achieved in a few weeks, 
namely the re-run of the second 
round of the presidential elections 
in 2004, which was assessed as 
not-free and unfair not only by the 
opposition and its supporters, but 
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
7oDNuDSBaGo 
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also by the West. In turn, Maidan 
had various goals, which have 
since changed, without a clear 
deadline. At the beginning it was a 
protest against the decision of the 
Ukrainian authorities that had re-
jected the possibility of signing the 
Association Agreement with the EU 
and an attempt to change their po-
sition. Then, after the Eastern Part-
nership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 
November 2013) and the brutal ac-
tion of the riot militia (Berkut) 
against students on the night of 30 
November 2013, a new wave of 
protest, which gathered several 
hundred thousand people in Kyiv, 
has risen against the autocratic be-
haviour of the authorities, and new 
demands have emerged, namely 
the dismissal of the government 
and earlier parliamentary and pres-
idential elections. For the protest-
ers, the presidential elections 
scheduled for March 2015 are too 
far ahead in the future. One cannot 
imagine that the massive protest in 
the centre of the Ukrainian capital 
will last for more than a year, yet 
there is still no clear time frame-
work.  
  
The difference mentioned above is 
also an explanation of the differ-
ence in the duration of these two 
protests. The Orange Revolution 
only lasted about two months. Mai-
dan has already existed for almost 
three months. In the case of the Or-
ange Revolution one could see the 
relatively fast process of political 
negotiations in which the authori-
ties and the opposition were more 
or less ready for a compromise, 
meaning the re-run of the second 
round of presidential elections. 
Now, the authorities have imitated 
real dialogue with the opposition, 
which cannot in fact fully control 
Maidan’s actions and mood. There-
fore, the Orange Revolution was a 
peaceful protest from the beginning 
to the end, while Maidan has had a 
violent dimension. 
 
The long duration of Maidan has 
provoked its growing radicalism. A 
part of the protesters are against 
further negotiations with President 
Yanukovych and the ruling elite as 
a whole. They support revolution-
ary changes. The Right Sector, a 
coalition of far-right organisations 
with some of them perceived as 
quasi-fascists militia, seems to rep-
resent this group of protesters. This 
new political movement is consid-
ered an initiator of the fight against 
units of the Ukrainian police and 
special forces of the Berkut on 19 
January 2014 on Hrushevsky 
Street in Kyiv. The action of Janu-
ary 19 resulted in an unbelievable 
increase in the recognition of the 
Right Sector. Just after the clash, 
they had a dozen thousand follow-
ers on the website VKontakte (the 
Russian version of Facebook); on 
Wednesday 22 January, this had 
increased to almost 52,000. What 
needs to be emphasised is that 
even if the general views of the 
Right Sector do not find much sup-
port among society, in the current 
circumstances there is a significant 
number of people who silently 
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agree with their method of action. 
These people are simply discour-
aged with the ineffective talks com-
ing out of Maidan; they are eager to 
see direct action and believe that a 
physical clash is the only solution. 
 
It should be noted that there is gen-
erally a stronger presence of far-
right activists and the visibility of 
nationalist symbols in Maidan than 
during the Orange Revolution. But 
this doesn’t mean that Maidan is a 
nationalist protest of extreme 
forces, as is frequently described 
by the Ukrainian authorities. And 
one has to understand that there 
are significant differences between 
far-right movements. On the one 
hand, Svoboda is treated by the 
Right Sector as liberals and the 
systemic opposition, while on the 
other, Svoboda is trying to show its 
human face and does not want its 
activists to be engage in riots and 
be treated as a provocateur of 
clashes.6  
 
And last, but certainly, not least, the 
difference between the Orange 
Revolution and Maidan is the role 
of new technology and the growing 
use of the Internet. It is often noted 
that the Orange Revolution was the 
first protest of the Internet era in 
Ukraine. Maidan, however, is much 
more deeply linked to new technol-
ogy than the Orange Revolution. 
Progress in IT technology has 
                                                          
6 http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/ 
_otvetstvennost-za-sobytiya-na-ulice- 
grushevskogo-vzyala-na-sebya 
-organizaciya-pr/537135; 
given the people of Ukraine a new 
weapon that was not available dur-
ing the Orange Revolution and the 
other massive Ukrainian protests – 
well developed social networks. 
Facebook, Twitter, online brands of 
the most prominent Ukrainian jour-
nals, as well as online TV channels 
are readily available and Ukrainian 
activists tend to exploit then in 
every possible way.  
 
Facebook is the main source. It 
serves not only as an information 
platform where the only thing you 
have to do to follow the news about 
Ukraine is to “like” the Facebook 
profiles of the best Ukrainian jour-
nals, thematic, or journalists’ pro-
file. Facebook is a place where 
people communicate their willing-
ness to go out and protest with 
each other, seek other people to 
join them in protest, and give their 
own expression about what is go-
ing on during day and night on Mai-
dan. People organise themselves 
every time it is necessary via Face-
book. They did so, for example, 
during the the night of 11 Decem-
ber 2013, when Ukrainian police 
and Berkut seemed to storm the 
Maidan – the action Everybody on 
Maidan was spread so widely and 
effectively that people even started 
to discuss who was driving from 
what part of Kyiv and how many 
people he/she could carry in his/her 
car. One could even perceive the 
http://www.nr2.ru/kiev/480770.html; 
http://www.profi-forex.org/novosti-
mira/novosti-sng/ukraine/entry10 
08195792.html 
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Facebook announcement by 
Ukrainska Pravda journalist Mus-
tafa Nayem as a trigger for the en-
tire Euromaidan and the first pro-
tests. It was Nayem who first pub-
lished, just after Viktor Yanu-
kovych’s statement that Ukraine 
would not sign the Association 
Agreement, the announcement to 
take to the streets and start a pro-
European demonstration.7 Anyone 
registered on Facebook can also 
follow Maidaners – a profile con-
taining the histories of ordinary 
Ukrainians who have decided to 
take part in the protest on Inde-
pendence Square, and read about 
their feelings and motivations, etc.8  
The profile was only available in 
Ukrainian at the beginning, but it is 
now possible to follow it in English, 
Russian, Polish, and other lan-
guages. Online TV stations such as 
Hromadske.tv9 and Espreso.tv10 
are also very interesting and im-
portant sources of information. 
 
It should also be strongly under-
lined that the authorities don’t have 
the information advantage over so-
ciety as they had in the past. This 
phenomenon changes the situation 
dramatically in comparison with the 
pre-IT technology era. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 To learn more watch an interview with 
Mustafa Nayem at: http://video.or-
ange.mu/news/the-interview-mustafa-
nayem-ukrainian-journalist-and-activist-
2/ 
 
The year 2014 – society against 
the authorities and with the op-
position? 
 
The situation in Ukraine is chang-
ing very quickly and is almost un-
predictable. One can, therefore, try 
to write many scenarios, but these 
are just general remarks rather 
than scenarios. 
 
First, January 2014 has shown that 
the protests are not just limited to 
Kyiv, but society is very active in 
many Ukrainian regions manifest-
ing their anti-governmental posi-
tion. This phenomenon has 
changed the situation dramatically. 
It seems that the protests outside 
Kyiv were decisive and saved Mai-
dan. The central authorities have 
lost control or have limited control 
over one-third of the country. It will 
be an extremely difficult for Yanu-
kovych to restore full control over 
these parts of Ukraine, especially 
over Western Ukraine. It should be 
strongly underlined that the author-
ities and the opposition will not be 
able to reach a political solution 
without society and its acceptance, 
as ignoring society will lead to more 
protests, which could become un-
controllable. It seems that both the 
ruling elite, part of it at least, and 
the main opposition forces under-
stand this danger more and more. 
8To learn more about Maidaners visit: 
www.facebook.com/maidaners  
9 http://hromadske.tv/ 
10 http://espreso.tv/ 
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Second, actions undertaken by the 
authorities, President Yanukovych, 
and the government after the be-
ginning of Maidan in November 
2013 can be assessed as a long list 
of enormous mistakes that pro-
voked the escalation of the protests 
and tension in society. The ruling 
elite would like to govern Ukraine 
as a whole, just like they ruled Don-
bas from the 1990s (Yanukovych 
was appointed governor of Donetsk 
oblast in 1997), but this is simply 
impossible as people in many other 
parts of Ukraine, not only in West-
ern regions, are strongly against 
the bandit methods used by the 
current authorities. The authorities 
would like to impose fear as a tool 
to pacify society, although this will 
certainly not work. What it shows is 
that the ruling elite is not able to un-
derstand the mood and position of 
the majority of Ukrainian society 
and want to impose methods used 
by the Russian or Belarusian au-
thorities. They don’t understand the 
basic rules of democracy and want 
to stay in power forever. Thus, they 
are anachronistic in comparison to 
the growing number of Ukrainians. 
This creates even more trouble for 
Ukraine, as the ruling elite (at least 
the hawks among them) cannot 
think about a compromise. But it 
doesn’t mean that they cannot win 
and overcome society’s aspira-
tions, although it seems that they 
are not able pacify society for a 
long time, and further protests will 
later erupt. 
 
Third, the authorities can only mo-
bilise people from Donbas (the Do-
netsk and Luhansk regions) and 
Crimea against pro-European and 
pro-democratic protesters, but 
even in these regions a vivid reac-
tion of the inhabitants as a whole 
cannot be expected. However, they 
can provoke resentment between 
Western and Central Ukraine on 
the one hand, and Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine on the other. Ir-
respective of their political position, 
West Ukrainians could be por-
trayed as nationalists, fascists, and 
extremists. 
 
Fourth, cooperation between civil 
society, the younger generation on 
the one hand and the political op-
position and its leaders on the 
other, will be one of the most diffi-
cult challenges, especially if the 
protests are prolonged due to a 
lack of solution at the political level. 
The anti-systemic dimension of 
Maidan will probably still exist in the 
subsequent months and could 
even grow. This would create neg-
ative circumstances for both the 
political opposition and society. 
 
Fifth, the problems in relations be-
tween the political opposition as a 
whole and the protesters (the 
younger generation, representa-
tives of civil society) could provoke 
tension between the three main po-
litical leaders and parties. Serious 
quarrels between opposition lead-
ers are possible in the upcoming 
months. 
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Finally, the far-right movement, the 
Right Sector, will still be visible but 
cannot achieve much more support 
in Ukrainian society. However, their 
visibility could spoil the opposition’s 
image inside and outside Ukraine. 
This is certainly a very important 
challenge for the pro-democratic 
and pro-European forces in Ukrain-
ian society. Nevertheless, despite 
the radicalism, Maidan in Kyiv and 
the manifestations in other Ukrain-
ian cities have been the protests of 
the pro-democratic and pro-Euro-
pean part of Ukrainian society 
against the authoritarianism of the 
authorities. 
 
* * * 
 
Taking into account the growing 
role of society in the political pro-
cess in Ukraine, EU proposals for 
this country should be oriented not 
only towards the political opposition 
and the authorities, but more and 
more towards society. European 
Union support for the pro-European 
part of Ukrainian society should 
first of all include a clear statement 
on Ukraine’s European aspirations 
according to article 49 of the Treaty 
on the European Union. The EU 
should make a political statement 
that a visa free regime for Ukraini-
ans will be introduced when the 
Ukrainian authorities fulfil the obli-
gations of the Visa Liberalisation 
Action Plan. These two statements 
would enormously increase the 
EU’s credibility in the eyes of 
Ukrainian society.
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